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Building resilience in urban drainage systems requires consideration of a wide range of threats that
contribute to urban ﬂooding. Existing hydraulic reliability based approaches have focused on quantifying
functional failure caused by extreme rainfall or increase in dry weather ﬂows that lead to hydraulic
overloading of the system. Such approaches however, do not fully explore the full system failure scenario
space due to exclusion of crucial threats such as equipment malfunction, pipe collapse and blockage that
can also lead to urban ﬂooding. In this research, a new analytical approach based on global resilience
analysis is investigated and applied to systematically evaluate the performance of an urban drainage
system when subjected to a wide range of structural failure scenarios resulting from random cumulative
link failure. Link failure envelopes, which represent the resulting loss of system functionality (impacts)
are determined by computing the upper and lower limits of the simulation results for total ﬂood volume
(failure magnitude) and average ﬂood duration (failure duration) at each link failure level. A new
resilience index that combines the failure magnitude and duration into a single metric is applied to
quantify system residual functionality at each considered link failure level. With this approach, resilience
has been tested and characterised for an existing urban drainage system in Kampala city, Uganda. In
addition, the effectiveness of potential adaptation strategies in enhancing its resilience to cumulative link
failure has been tested.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recent natural and manmade catastrophic events that have led
to extreme ﬂooding in various cities worldwide have underscored
the need to build resilience into existing urban drainage and ﬂood
management systems as a key strategy to minimise the resulting
ﬂooding impacts and consequences (Djordjevic et al., 2011; Park
et al., 2013). Urban drainage system ﬂooding is not only caused by
external climate-related and urbanisation threats such as extreme
rainfall and increasing urbanisation but also internal system threats
for example equipment malfunction, sewer collapse and blockages
(Kellagher et al., 2009; Mugume et al., 2014; Ryu and Butler, 2008;
Ten Veldhuis, 2010). System or component failures can either be
abrupt (unexpected) shocks for example pump or sensor failure or
chronic pressures such as asset aging and long term asset decay or
sewer sedimentation. The impact of such failures, either singly or ine).
r Ltd. This is an open access articlecombination on existing urban drainage infrastructure could
signiﬁcantly reduce the expected ﬂood protection service levels in
cities and lead to negative consequences such as loss of lives,
damage to properties and critical infrastructure (Djordjevic et al.,
2011; IPCC, 2014; Ryu and Butler, 2008; Ten Veldhuis, 2010).
Consequently, the need to build resilience in urban drainage
systems (UDSs) is increasingly recognised as vital to enhance their
ability to maintain acceptable ﬂood protection service levels in
cities that they serve and to minimise the resulting ﬂooding con-
sequences during unexpected or exceptional loading conditions
that lead to system failure (Butler et al., 2014; Djordjevic et al.,
2011). Although the application of concept of resilience to infra-
structure systems is a recent development, there is an extensive
literature on deﬁnitions and interpretation of resilience, much of
which has come from the ecological systems academic community
(Butler et al., 2014; Park et al., 2013). Ecological system resilience is
interpreted as a measure of system integrity and is deﬁned as a
system's ability to maintain its basic structure and patterns of
behaviour (i.e. to persist) through absorbing shocks or disturbances
under dynamic (non-equilibrium) conditions (Holling, 1996). Inunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Nomenclature
rsi random link failure sequence
nsi random failure sequences for the existing system
csi random failure sequences for the centralised
storage strategy
dsi random failure sequences for the distributed
storage strategy
N total number of links
n Manning's roughness coefﬁcient
tf mean duration of nodal ﬂooding
tn total elapsed (simulation) time
Reso Resilience index
Pf Maximum system failure level
Pa Accepteable system performance level
Po Original system performance level
Sevi Severity
Sevp Peak Severity
T rainfall return period in years
VTF total ﬂood volume
VTI total inﬂow volume
m mean
s standard deviation
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intentional human invention and are designed to provide
continued (uninterrupted) services to society in an efﬁcient
manner (Blackmore and Plant, 2008; Holling, 1996; Park et al.,
2013). Engineering system resilience is therefore interpreted
differently from ecological resilience and focuses on ensuring
continuity and efﬁciency of system function during and after failure
(Butler et al., 2014; Lansey, 2012).
In the context of urban drainage, current hydraulic reliability-
based design and rehabilitation approaches tend to focus on pre-
vention of hydraulic (functional) failures resulting from a speciﬁed
design storm of a given frequency (i.e. return period). The design
storm return period determines the ﬂood protection level provided
by the system (Butler and Davies, 2011). Hydraulic reliability-based
approaches place signiﬁcant emphasis on identifying and quanti-
fying the probability of occurrence of extreme rainfall and mini-
mising the probability of the resulting hydraulic failures i.e. the fail-
safe approach (Ryu and Butler, 2008; Thorndahl and Willems,
2008). However, such approaches fail to consider other causes of
failure for example structural or component failures (Table 1)
which also lead to ﬂooding (e.g. Kellagher et al., 2009; Mugume
et al., 2014; Ten Veldhuis, 2010).
Furthermore, it is argued that the direct application of
reliability-based approaches for evaluation of structural failures in
UDSs could be insufﬁcient mainly because causes and mechanisms
of failure are largely unknown and difﬁcult to quantify (Ana and
Bauwens, 2010; Kellagher et al., 2009; Park et al., 2013; Ten
Veldhuis, 2010). It is therefore important to develop new ap-
proaches that seek to ensure that UDSs are designed to not only beTable 1
Failure modes in urban drainage systems.
Failure mode Description
Functional failure Hydraulic overloading due to changes in inﬂows leading to
e.g. overﬂow operation, surcharging and surface ﬂooding
Structural failure Malfunctioning of single or multiple components in the sy
pumps, tanks or pipes leading to the inability of the failed
to deliver its desired function in full or in partreliable during normal (standard) loading conditions but also to be
resilient to unexpected (exceptional) conditions i.e. the safe-fail
approach (Butler et al., 2014; Mugume et al., 2014). In this study,
the deﬁnition and interpretation of resilience in engineering sys-
tems is pursued. Resilience is formally deﬁned based on recent
work on ‘Safe and SuRe’ Water Management as the “the degree to
which the system minimises level of service failure magnitude and
duration over its design life when subject to exceptional conditions”
(Butler et al., 2014). Exceptional conditions refer to uncertain
threats or disturbances that lead to system failure for example
climate change induced extreme rainfall events, sewer collapse or
blockage. Based on this deﬁnition, the goal of resilience is therefore
to maintain acceptable functionality levels (by withstanding ser-
vice failure) and to rapidly recover from failure once it occurs
(Butler et al., 2014; Lansey, 2012; Park et al., 2013).
Resilience is further classiﬁed into two broad categories: a)
general (attribute-based) resilience which refers to the state of the
system that enables it to limit failure duration andmagnitude to any
threat (i.e. all hazards including unknowns) and b) speciﬁed (per-
formance-based) resilience which refers to the agreed performance
of the system in limiting failure magnitude and duration to a given
(known) threat (Butler et al., 2014; Scholz et al., 2011). Reliability on
the other hand is deﬁned as the degree to which the system mini-
mises the level of service failure frequency over its design life when
subject to standard loading (Butler et al., 2014). Intuitively, it is
argued that reliability and resilience are related with the latter
extending and building on the former. It is consequently postulated
that if resilience builds on reliability, by improving the former, the
latter can also be improved (Butler et al., 2014).
Taking the UK water sector as an example, recent studies have
proposed range of strategies or options for building resilience in
UDSs (Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2011; CIRIA, 2014; Mcbain et al., 2010).
These strategies generally seek to enhance inbuilt system prop-
erties or attributes such as redundancy and ﬂexibility during
design, retroﬁt or rehabilitation so as to inﬂuence the ability of
the system to withstand the level of service failure and to rapidly
recover from failure once it occurs (Hassler and Kohler, 2014;
Vugrin et al., 2011). Redundancy is deﬁned as the degree of
overlapping function in a system that permits the system to
change in order to allow vital functions to continue while
formerly redundant elements take on new functions (Hassler and
Kohler, 2014). In UDSs, redundancy is enhanced by introducing
multiple elements (components) providing similar functions for
example storage tanks or parallel pipes, in order to minimise
failure propagation through the system or to enable operations to
be diverted to alternative parts of the system during exceptional
loading conditions (Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2011; Mugume et al., 2014).
Flexibility on the other hand is deﬁned as the inbuilt system
capability to adjust or reconﬁgure so as to maintain acceptable
performance levels when subject to multiple (varying) loading
conditions (Gersonius et al., 2013; Vugrin et al., 2011). It can be
achieved in UDSs, for example, by designing in future prooﬁng
options (Gersonius et al., 2013), use of distributed (decentralised)
or modular elements for example distributed storage tanks,
rainwater harvesting systems, roof disconnection and use ofExamples/Causes
failure Increase in dry weather ﬂows, extreme rainfall events,
excessive inﬁltration
stem such as
component
Pipe collapse, blockages, sediment deposition, solid waste,
pump failure, rising main failure
S.N. Mugume et al. / Water Research 81 (2015) 15e26 17designed multifunctional urban spaces such as car parks, play-
grounds or roads (Mugume et al., 2014).
However, the operationalisation of resilience in urban drainage
and ﬂood management is still constrained by lack of guidelines,
standards, and suitable quantitative evaluation methods (Butler
et al., 2014; Ofwat, 2012; Park et al., 2013). In water distribution
systems, a number of recent studies have investigated both
component (structural) and hydraulic reliability when subject to
stresses such as demand variations, single pipe failure and changes
in pipe roughness (Atkinson et al., 2014; Trifunovic, 2012). In urban
drainage systems however, most quantitative studies tend to focus
on investigating hydraulic reliabilitywhich only considers functional
failures such as occurrence of extreme rainfall or increasing dry
weather ﬂows (Sun et al., 2011; Thorndahl andWillems, 2008). The
main short coming of such approaches is that the full system failure
scenario space that includes other causes of surface ﬂooding such
as equipment failure, sewer collapse and blockage is not explored.
It is recognised that different threats or combinations of threats
such as extreme rainfall or sewer failure could lead to the same
failed state (i.e. surface ﬂooding). Therefore, by only considering a
narrow range of hydraulic failures, current approaches take a
limited view of functional resilience with no due consideration
given to structural resilience. Further research is needed to develop
new quantitative approaches that explicitly consider all possible
failure scenarios in order to holistically evaluate resilience in UDSs
(Butler et al., 2014; Kellagher et al., 2009; Ofwat, 2012; Ten
Veldhuis, 2010).
In this study, a new Global Resilience Analysis (GRA) approach
is developed, that shifts the object of analysis from the threats
themselves to explicit consideration of system performance (i.e.
failed states) when subject to large number of failure scenarios
(Johansson, 2010). Global Resilience Analysis has been carried out
by evaluating the effect of a wide range of progressive structural
failure scenarios in various systems such as water distribution
systems and electrical power systems (Johansson, 2010). The GRA
methodology is extended to investigate the effect of random cu-
mulative link (sewer) failure scenarios on the performance of an
UDS. The methodology is then applied to test the effect of
implementing two potential adaptation strategies that is; intro-
ducing a large centralised detention pond or use of spatially
distributed storage tanks on minimising loss of functionality
during the considered structural failure scenarios.
The key strengths of the developed GRA method is that
emphasis is shifted from accurate quantiﬁcation of the probability
of occurrence of sewer failures (e.g. Egger et al., 2013), to evaluating
the effect of different sewer failures modes and extent, irrespective
of their occurrence probability, on the ability of an UDS to minimise
the resulting ﬂooding impacts (e.g. Kellagher et al., 2009).
Link failure envelopes, which show the upper and lower limits
(bounds) of the resulting loss of functionality for each considered
link failure level are determined based on the hydraulic simulation
results from 49,200 scenarios. The failure envelopes reﬂect vital
system resilience properties that determine the resulting loss of
functionality when the system is subjected to increasing failure
levels. Finally, a new resilience index, Reso that quantiﬁes system
residual functionality as a function of failure magnitude and
duration is computed at each failure level for both the existing
system and for the tested adaptation strategies.
2. Methods
2.1. Global Resilience Analysis (GRA) approach
Global Resilience Analysis is applied to characterise the perfor-
mance of an existing UDSwhen subject to awide range of structuralfailure scenarios involving random cumulative link failure. Struc-
tural failure in an UDS can be modelled by removal of components
for example sewers (links), storage tanks or pumps in the system to
represent the inability of the removed component to deliver its
prescribed function. In this study, links in an UDS are randomly and
cumulatively failed and the resulting impacts on the global per-
formance of the system are investigated at each failure level, until
all the links in the system have been failed. This process of cumu-
lative link failure is used to represent structural failure modes such
as sewer collapse, blockages and sediment deposition in closed
systems and blockage resulting from deposition of solid waste and
washed-in sediments in open channel systems. The approach of
failing links randomly ensures that all links, N in the system have an
equal probability of being removed (Johansson and Hassel, 2012). In
addition, a step by step increase in sewer failure levels enables the
exploration of the full sewer failure scenario space that ranges from
predictable or commonly occurring failure scenarios such as single
component (N  1), or two component (N  2) failure modes but
also other unexpected scenarios involving simultaneous failure of a
large number of components (e.g. Johansson, 2010; Park et al.,
2013).
To fully explore the extent of the failure scenario space in global
resilience analysis, a very large number of model of simulations
involving different failure scenarios would be required to capture
the resulting ﬂooding impacts (e.g. Kellagher et al., 2009). In
addition, different possible sewer (link) states for example non-
failed (good condition), partial or complete failure need to be
evaluated (Ana and Bauwens, 2010; Kellagher et al., 2009). Taking
an UDS with 81 links as an example, and assuming only two link
states (non-failed or completely failed), the total number of link
failure scenarios within the full failure scenario space would be
2.4  1024. To reduce the computational time, a convergence
analysis (Trelea, 2003) is carried out to determine the minimum
number of random cumulative link failure sequences, rsx that are
required to achieve consistent results (refer to Supplementary
information Section 1.1). Given the signiﬁcant computational
burden of GRA, a simple 1D approach to modelling of surface
ﬂooding (of the minor system) is proposed rather than using more
complex 2D overland ﬂow models (Digman et al., 2014;
Maksimovic et al., 2009).
2.2. GRA implementation
The GRA method is implemented in the MATLAB environment
linked to the Storm Water Management Model, SWMMv.5.1; a
physically based discrete time hydrological and hydraulic model
that can be used for single event and continuous simulation of run-
off quantity and quality, primarily built for urban areas (Rossman,
2010). Link failure can be modelled in SWMMv5.1 by either
signiﬁcantly reducing pipe diameters in the model (e.g. Mugume
et al., 2014) or increasing the Manning's roughness coefﬁcient, n
to a very high value. In this study, link failure is modelled by
increasing the Manning's n from its initial (non-failed) state value
(n¼ 0.020) to a very high value (n¼ 100). The high value of n was
chosen because it signiﬁcantly curtails the conveyance of ﬂows in
each failed link and hence enables modelling of complete failure of
each link.
Model simulations are carried out at each randomly generated
link failure level and system performance is quantiﬁed using the
total ﬂood volume and mean duration of nodal ﬂooding as key
performance indicators. Surface ﬂooding is simply modelled using
the ponding option inbuilt in SWMM which allows exceedance
ﬂows to be stored atop of the nodes and to subsequently re-enter
the UDS when the capacity allows (Rossman, 2010). The ﬂooding
extent at each node is modelled using an assumed ponded area of
Fig. 1. Modelling framework for random cumulative link failure in a simpliﬁed urban drainage system with 8 links, 8 nodes and 1 outfall illustrating (a) random and increasing link
failure levels c1, c2, c3 … cN and (b) three potential random failure sequences rs1, rs2 and rs3.
S.N. Mugume et al. / Water Research 81 (2015) 15e26187500 m2. Fig. 1 further illustrates the adopted modelling frame-
work. The main steps in implementing the GRA include:
a) A simulation is run to assess UDS performance in its initial
(non-failed) state using the considered extreme rainfall
loading
b) A randomly selected single link ci: i¼ 1, 2, 3,… N, in the UDS
is failed and a simulation is run using the same extreme
rainfall loading. This step represents single link failure mode
and is denoted as N  1.
c) Two randomly selected links, in the UDS are failed (denoted
as N  2 failure mode) and the simulation is repeated
d) The procedure is repeated for all N  i: i¼ 1, 2, 3,… N failure
modes until all the links in the system have been failed.
e) The procedure in (a)e(d) is repeated to determine the min-
imum number of random failure sequences rsx that ensures
convergence of results. A detailed description of convergence
analysis in GRA is presented in the Supplementary
information Section 1.1).
f) Using the determined rsx, the procedure in (a)e(d) above is
repeated to investigate the effect of the proposed adaptation
strategies on minimising the loss of system functionality
resulting from the considered cumulative link failure
scenarios.Fig. 2. Theoretical system performance curve for an urban drainage system. The black
solid horizontal line, Po represents the original (design) performance level of service.
The blue dotted line, Pa represents a lower but acceptable level of service. Pf represents
the maximum system failure level resulting from the considered threat. (For inter-
pretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the
web version of this article.)2.3. Determination of link failure envelopes
The use of average values in reliability and resilience analysis
simpliﬁes results interpretation but can potentially hide key in-
formation about the range of possible failure impacts and conse-
quences (Trifunovic, 2012). The process of determining failure
envelopes provides a means of graphically illustrating the range of
failure impacts at each considered failure level (e.g. Church and
Scaparra, 2007). In this study, link failure envelopes are deter-
mined by computing the minimum and maximum values of all
model solutions (total ﬂood volume and mean duration of nodal
ﬂooding) obtained at each considered link failure level for the
existing UDS and for the considered adaptation strategies. Theresulting envelopes represent the upper and lower limits of the
resulting loss of system functionality (impacts) that therefore
provide vital information about the resilience properties of the
system being tested. If the resulting envelope covers solutions with
lower impacts at all link failure levels, then the resulting loss of
system functionality is minimised during the considered failure
scenarios. If the resulting envelope covers solutions with higher
impacts and with a larger range between the minimum and
maximum values, the tested system exhibits higher loss of system
functionality during the considered failure scenarios (e.g. O'Kelly
and Kim, 2007).
2.4. Computation of the ﬂood resilience index
The resilience index, Reso, is used to link the resulting loss of
functionality to the system's residual functionality and hence the
level of resilience at each link failure level. The resulting loss of
S.N. Mugume et al. / Water Research 81 (2015) 15e26 19system functionality is estimated using the concept of severity, Sevi
(Hwang et al., 2015; Lansey, 2012). Severity is interpreted as a
function of maximum failure magnitude (peak severity) and failure
duration (Fig. 2). Fig. 2 illustrates the theoretical response of an UDS
(in which one or more links have been failed) to a single extreme
rainfall loading scenario. In Fig. 2, severity can be estimated as the
(shaded) area between the original system performance level, Po
and the actual system performance curve, Pi(t), at any time t after
occurrence of a given threat that lead to system failure (Equation
(1)).
Sevi ¼ f
h
Sevp; tf
i
¼ 1
Po
Ztn
to
ðPo  PiðtÞÞdt (1)
Where tf is the failure duration, to the time of occurrence of the
threat, and tn the total elapse time. Equation (1) above is further
simpliﬁed by assuming that the system failure and recovery curve is
rectangular (Equation (2))
Sevi ¼
VTF
VTI
 tr  tfs
tn  to ¼
VTF
VTI
 tf
tn
(2)
The resilience index, Reso, which is a measure of system residual
functionality, is estimated as one minus the computed volumetric
severity and is computed at each link failure level (Equation (3)).
Reso ¼ 1 Sevi ¼ 1
VTF
VTI
 tf
tn
(3)
Where VTF is the total ﬂood volume, VTI the total inﬂow into the
system, tf the mean duration of nodal ﬂooding and tn the total
elapsed (simulation) time.
For a given threat (i.e. percentage of failed links), the proposed
index quantiﬁes the residual functionality of the UDS as function of
both the failure magnitude (total ﬂood volume) and duration
(mean nodal ﬂood duration). Reso ranges from 0 to 1; with 0 indi-
cating the lowest level of resilience and 1 the highest level resil-
ience to the considered link failure scenarios. Resilience envelopes
are then derived by plotting the minimum and maximum values of
Reso computed at each failure against the percentage of failed links.
The resulting envelopes graphically illustrate the system residual
functionality at each considered link failure level. A detailed
description the theoretical behaviour of an UDS during failure
conditions and the derivation of the Reso is provided in
Supplementary information Section 1.3.Fig. 3. Digital elevation model and delineated sub catchments in the Nakivubo
catchment.3. Urban drainage system description and modelling results
3.1. Case study UDS
A case study of the existing urban drainage system in the
Nakivubo catchment, a highly urbanised part of Kampala city,
Uganda is used in this work. The system requires rehabilitation to
minimise the frequency, magnitude and duration of ﬂooding
during extreme convective rainfall events (Sliuzas et al., 2013). A
model of the existing system is built in SWMMv5.1. The full dy-
namic wave model in SWMM is used to route ﬂows through the
modelled UDS. The data needed to build the model has been ob-
tained from a Digital Elevation Model (DEM) for Kampala (2 m
horizontal resolution), a 2011 satellite image for Kampala (0.5 m
horizontal resolution), as-built drawings and from existing reports
(e.g. KCC, 2002). A single, non-areally adjusted extreme event was
used to represent a worst functional loading case in the GRA. This
event used was recorded on 25th June 2012 at 10 min resolutionwith a 100 min duration and depth of 66.2 mm (Sliuzas et al.,
2013).
The existing primary and secondary conveyance system con-
sists of trapezoidal open channel sections constructed using
reinforced concrete in upstream sections and gabion walls in the
downstream sections. The resulting hydraulic model of the system
consists of 81 links, 81 nodes and 1 outfall, and with a total
conduit length of 22,782 m. The system drains into the Nakivubo
wetland and ﬁnally into Lake Victoria. The gradients of the open
channel sections range from 0.001 to 0.0124. The modelled system
drains a total area of 2793 ha delineated into 31 sub-catchments
(Fig. 3). The computed average sub catchment slopes and per-
centage imperviousness values range from 0.034 to 0.172 (Fig. A.1)
and 52.3e85.7 (Table A.1) respectively. The existing system is not
always clean in a ‘business as usual’ case. This was reﬂected in the
SWMM model by taking the initial value of Manning's n as 0.020
which is the upper limit of the recommended range (i.e.
0.010e0.020) for concrete lined channels.
3.2. Modelling the effect of adaptation strategies on UDS
performance
Enhancing the resilience of an UDS during design or retroﬁt can
be achieved by altering its conﬁguration in order to enhance its
redundancy and ﬂexibility. Redundancy could be increased by
introducing extra elements such additional storage tanks, tem-
porary storage areas or increasing spare capacity in critical links
(Butler and Davies, 2011; Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2011; CIRIA, 2014). Flex-
ibility on the other hand can be increased, for example, by
designing in future prooﬁng options, use of distributed elements
and provision of back-up capacity (e.g. Gersonius et al., 2013). In
this study, two adaptation strategies are modelled and tested us-
ing the GRA methodology namely, addition of one large central-
ised detention pond (centralised storage strategy) and several,
spatially distributed storage tanks (distributed storage strategy)
respectively (Fig. A.2).
In the centralised storage (CS) strategy, a large centralised
detention pond with a total storage volume of 3.15  105 m3 is
introduced upstream of link C47 (Fig. A.2a) to enhance system
redundancy. In choosing the possible location of the centralised
storage tank, two main criteria were used; land availability and
ﬂow rates in the downstream links in the primary Nakivubo
channel. In the distributed storage (DS) strategy, 28 spatially
distributed upstream storage tanks with a combined total storage
volume of 3.15  105 m3 are introduced at the outlets of the sub
S.N. Mugume et al. / Water Research 81 (2015) 15e2620catchments to enhance ﬂexibility in crucial points in the network
(Fig. A.2b). The DS strategy models upstream distributed source
control.3.3. Simulation and performance assessment of the existing UDS
In order to test the performance of the modelled existing UDS,
simulations were carried out and ﬂows were investigated at
selected links in the system (Fig. 4). The hydraulic data on the
selected open channel cross sections is presented in Table A.2.
Lower peak ﬂow rates, are simulated in most upstream links.
The ﬂow rates increase along the system leading to very high
peaks in downstream links, for example ﬂows of 297.4 m3/s and
318.2 m3/s are simulated at downstream links C76 and C81
respectively after an elapsed time of 75 min (Fig. A.3). Globally,
57 links (70.4%) in the system experience hydraulic overloading
that consequently leads to surface ﬂooding. Hydraulic over-
loading in links occurs when: (i) the upstream ends of the link
run at full capacity and (ii) when the slope of the hydraulic grade
line exceeds the slope of the link (Butler and Davies, 2011). The
most severe hydraulic overloading is simulated in 26 links (32%),
with the duration of hydraulic overloading ranging from 13 to
54 min.
The results of the simulation also indicate the system experi-
ences ﬂooding at a total of 57 nodes, representing a ﬂood extent of
70.7%, with a total volume of ﬂooding of 706, 045 m3 and mean
nodal ﬂood duration of 48 ± 4 min.3.4. Global Resilience Analysis of the existing UDS
The proposed GRA methodology described in section 2 is
applied to characterise the performance of existing UDS. The
overall performance of the system is quantiﬁed by simulating
total ﬂood volume and mean duration of ﬂooding resulting from
16,400 link failure scenarios generated from 200 random link
failure sequences (Fig. A.4). The average values of the total ﬂood
volume and duration of nodal ﬂooding are computed for all the
considered link failure scenarios and are presented in Fig. 5. The
GRA results indicate that failure of just 10% of links leads to a
disproportionately large increase of 91% in total ﬂood volume
(Fig. 5a). Thereafter, further increase in the percentage of failed
links leads to comparatively small increases in the total ﬂood
volume.Fig. 4. Layout of the modelled Nakivubo urban drainage network.The situation is very different for nodal ﬂood duration, where
results show failure of 10% of links leads to just a 6% increase
(Fig. 5b). Globally, the results indicate that the failure duration in-
creases from 41 min to 56 min representing an increase of 36.2%
when all the links in the system are failed.3.5. Effect of adaptation strategies on system performance
The GRA methodology is applied to test each of the proposed
UDS adaptation strategies. An additional 16,400 link failure sce-
narios are simulated for the CS and DS strategies respectively that
is, a total of 32,800 generated from a total of 400 random link
failure sequences (Fig. A.4). The effect of the CS strategy is a slight
reduction of ﬂood volume which occurs at lower link failure
levels (less than 60%) with very little impact on ﬂood duration at
all failure levels. Globally, it results in a 3.4% reduction of total
ﬂood volume and a 1.1% increase in mean duration of ﬂooding
(Fig. 5).
On the other hand, the DS strategy results in a signiﬁcant
reduction of the total ﬂood volume (32%) at all considered link
failure levels. At link failure levels greater than 20% any additional
increase in link failure levels leads to minimal increase in total
ﬂood volume. The strategy also reduces the mean nodal ﬂooding
duration from 48 min to 35 min giving a reduction of 27% for all
considered link failure scenarios. Table 2 details the key statistics
of the GRA results for the existing system and for the considered
resilience strategies.3.6. Link failure envelopes
The resulting link failure envelopes which represent the range of
model solutions from the lowest to the highest ﬂooding impacts
computed at each link failure level are presented in Fig. 6. For the
existing UDS and considering the ﬂood volume, a large range of
deviation between the computed failure envelopes and the mean
values (27e87%) is observed at lower link failure levels (<20%). A
convergence of both failure envelopes is observed at higher link
failure levels. The results from the nodal ﬂood duration are
different, and indicate a narrow range of deviation (<26.3%) be-
tween resulting failure envelopes and the mean values at all link
failure levels. Rather similar ranges of deviation between the
resulting ﬂood volume and ﬂood duration failure envelopes and the
respective mean values are observed for the CS and DS strategies
respectively.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the considered adap-
tation strategies, the generated link failure envelopes are plotted
into one graph to map out the failure space common to all (Fig. 7).
Comparing the results of the CS strategy to those of the existing
system, a slight downward shift of both the maximum and mini-
mum ﬂood volume failure envelopes is observed at lower link
failure levels (<40%), which represents the effect of the strategy in
minimising the magnitude of ﬂooding. However, there is no sig-
niﬁcant effect at higher link failure levels. Also, the results suggest
that the CS strategy has minimal effect on the ﬂood duration failure
envelopes.
For the DS strategy, a signiﬁcant downward shift in the ﬂood
volume failure envelope (i.e. a reduction in the magnitude of
ﬂooding) is observed at all cumulative link failure levels. The
strategy limits further increase in ﬂood volume when link failure
levels exceed 33% (i.e. a ﬂattening of the ﬂood volume failure en-
velope is observed at higher link failure levels). The strategy also
shifts the ﬂood duration failure envelopes downwards (i.e. reduces
the failure duration) for all considered link failure levels when
compared the existing UDS.
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Fig. 5. Effect of cumulative link failure on (a) total ﬂood volume (b) mean duration of nodal ﬂooding for the existing UDS (ns mean), for the centralised storage strategy (cs mean)
and for the distributed storage strategy (ds mean).
Table 2
Mean values of GRA results for all considered link failure scenarios. The values in the square brackets indicate the reduction range computed by considering 1 standard
deviation of the mean.
Strategy Flood volume (x103 m3) Mean nodal ﬂood duration (hrs)
Mean, m Standard deviation, s % Reduction Mean, m Standard deviation, s % Reduction
Existing system 1457.5 143.6 0.80 0.07
Centralised storage 1408.8 183.4 3.3 [1.0e5.1] 0.81 0.07 1.1 [2.3 to 0.2]
Distributed storage 986.1 96.3 32.3 [29.9e34.1] 0.59 0.03 26.8 [25.6e28.4]
Fig. 6. Results of generated link failure envelopes for total ﬂood volume (a)e(c) and for mean duration of nodal ﬂooding (e)e(f) for the existing UDS and for the CS and DS strategies.
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Fig. 7. Intersection of cumulative link failure envelopes for the existing system and for the CS and DS strategies.
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The resilience index (Reso) is computed using Equation (3).
Based on the computed indices, resilience envelopes which repre-
sent the residual functionality of the whole UDS as a function of
both the failure magnitude and duration are determined by
computing the minimum and maximum values of Reso at each link
failure level for the existing system for the tested adaptation stra-
tegies (Fig. 8). To facilitate comparison of the performance of the
tested strategies, an assumed acceptable level of resilience
threshold of 0.7 is plotted on each of the graphs, as an example of
the minimum acceptable ﬂood protection level of service (for
example no property ﬂooding) that needs to be achieved by the
considered adaptation strategies.
The ﬁgure reveals large variations in Reso for the existing system
and for the tested strategies at lower link failure levels (<20%) with
a convergence of the results occurring with increasing link failure
levels. For the existing UDS, the computed mean values of Reso
range from 0.54 to 0.66. When compared to the resilience
threshold, the results indicate that the existing system crosses this
threshold when link failure levels in system exceed 6.2%.
Considering the CS strategy, a slight improvement in Reso of
1.2e2.3% is observed. The results indicate that resilience index falls
below the threshold value when link failure levels exceed 8.6%.
When the distributed storage strategy is considered, higher mean
values of Reso are computed (0.76e0.84). The results also indicateFig. 8. Resilience envelopes showing maximum, mean, minimum values of Reso computed a
dashed dot horizontal line is an assumed minimum acceptable resilience level of service th
reader is referred to the web version of this article.)that for the DS strategy, the resilience threshold is not crossed at all
link failure levels. Overall, the DS strategy leads to signiﬁcant
improvement in the Reso of 27.5e41.4%.
4. Discussion of results
4.1. Existing system
Considering the existing system, random failure of less than 20%
of the links leads to disproportionately high degradation of system
functionality magnitude (i.e. total ﬂood volume). The dispropor-
tionately high loss of system functionality suggests that failure of a
small fraction of links rapidly reduces the global hydraulic
conveyance capacity of the (minor) system. This result is also
conﬁrmed by critical component analysis (Johansson and Hassel,
2012) involving targeted failure of single (individual) links in the
UDS (Refer to Supplementary information Section 1.1, Fig. S2) This
therefore suggests that the existing UDS exhibits low levels of
resilience to sewer failures. This could be attributed to the already
insufﬁcient hydraulic capacity of the system (due to use of an
extreme rainstorm for modelling purposes) but could also be
attributed to other key factors such as its dendritic network to-
pology and limitations of using 1D modelling approach which ex-
cludes the contribution of the major system (i.e. effect of additional
redundancies) in conveying surface ﬂows to downstream parts of
the system during extreme events.t each link failure level for (a) existing UDS, (b) CS strategy and (c) DS strategy. The red
reshold of 0.7. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this ﬁgure legend, the
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failure has a limited effect on mean nodal ﬂood duration. This could
be attributed to use of a single short duration rainfall event for the
simulations as opposed to using multiple events. Similarly, this
could also be attributed limitations of using a simpliﬁed above
ground ﬂood model. By using a simpliﬁed above-ground ﬂood
model, surface ﬂooding which occurs in the major system (i.e.
overland ﬂood pathways such as roads, paths or grass ways) during
extreme events and which may also cause substantial damage to
property and infrastructure is not considered, which could also lead
to inaccurate estimation of the mean ﬂood duration (e.g. Digman
et al., 2014; Maksimovic et al., 2009).
4.2. Effect of adaptation strategies
It is argued that an effective adaptation strategy should result in
a downward shift (i.e. towards the origin) of the failure envelope of
the existing system. By doing this, the failure magnitude and
duration is minimised across the considered failure scenarios. The
derived link failure envelopes suggest that CS strategy has a very
limited effect on minimising the total ﬂood volume, with the
reduction being achieved at lower link failure levels. More so, no
signiﬁcant effect on ﬂood duration is observed at all considered link
failure levels. As a consequence, the CS strategy only minimally
improves the residual functionality of the existing system during
the considered link failure scenarios. This therefore suggests that
sewer failures could signiﬁcantly limit the effectiveness of adap-
tation strategies involving enhancement of redundancy at a single
location in the UDS. This also suggests that other preventive asset
management strategies for example improved cleaning and main-
tenance practices may be more effective for resilience enhance-
ment, because they in increase spare capacity in the links
themselves and minimise structural failure in existing systems (e.g.
Ten Veldhuis, 2010).
In contrast to the CS strategy, the study results suggest that the
DS strategy is more effective in minimising the resulting loss of
functionality at all link failure levels. This could be attributed to the
effect of increased the spatial distribution of control strategies (i.e.
smaller decentralised upstream storage tanks with the same total
storage volume as the CS strategy) results in optimal use of the total
storage volume for reduction both the stormwater volume and the
inﬂow rates before entry into UDS. Reducing the storm water in-
ﬂows into the system in turn enables the degraded UDS to continue
functioning with minimal impacts. It could also be due to a
reduction in propagation of hydraulic failures from one part of the
UDS to another, which suggests that the DS strategy improves the
ﬂexibility properties of the whole (minor) system. Using this
argument, it could be suggested that adaptation strategies that
increase the spatial distribution of control strategies in upstream
parts of the catchment for example implementation of multifunc-
tional (dual-purpose) rainwater harvesting (DeBusk, 2013) at a city
district or catchment scale could signiﬁcantly increase the resil-
ience UDSs to sewer failures.
4.3. Outlook
The developed global resilience analysis approach presents a
promising quantitative tool which opens up new opportunities for
holistic and systematic evaluation of the effect of a wide range of
threats that have not been considered in conventional hydraulic
reliability based urban drainage design and rehabilitation ap-
proaches. Future research will compare the results obtained by the
presented GRAmethodwith those obtained by using dual-drainage
(1De1D) or 2D rapid ﬂood spreading models (e.g. Blanc et al., 2012;
Maksimovic et al., 2009) in GRA to account for the effect of themajor system in providing additional system redundancies during
ﬂooding conditions.
Additionally, the following areas are recommended for further
research.
 Investigation of the inﬂuence of inherent/inbuilt UDS charac-
teristics for example network structure, network size (number
of links), pipe diameters, pipe gradients on resilience to struc-
tural failures.
 Investigation of the effect of other types of component failures
(e.g. pump failures) on global resilience in UDSs.
 Investigation of the linkages and interdependences between
UDS failure (ﬂooding) and unexpected failures in inter-
connected systems such as electrical power systems.
 Further investigation aimed at linking the computed resilience
indices to new resilience-based ﬂood protection level of service
standards that are based on minimisation of the magnitude and
duration ﬂooding as opposed to use of design return periods.
5. Conclusions
This research has tested and extended the global resilience
analysis (GRA) methodology to systematically evaluate UDS system
resilience to random cumulative link (sewer) failure. The GRA
method presents a new and promising approach for performance
evaluation of UDSs that shifts emphasis from prediction of the
probability of occurrence of key threats that lead to ﬂooding (the
fail-safe approach) to evaluating the effects of awide range of failure
scenarios that not only includes functional failures but also struc-
tural or component failures which also contribute to ﬂooding in
cities (the safe-fail approach).
In this study, the effect of a wide range of random and pro-
gressive link failure scenarios on the ability of existing and adapted
UDSs to minimise the resulting loss of functionality has been
investigated. Link failure envelopes have been determined by
computing the minimum and maximum values of the total ﬂood
volume and mean nodal ﬂood duration results generated by
simulating a large number of random cumulative link failure sce-
narios. A new resilience index has been developed and used to link
the resulting loss of functionality to the system's residual func-
tionality at each link failure level. Based on the results of the study,
the following conclusions are drawn.
 The presented global resilience analysis approach provides a
promising quantitative evaluation tool that enables consider-
ation of wide range of possible sewer failure scenarios ranging
from normal to unexpected with reduced computational
complexity.
 The use of convergence analysis enables determination of the
minimum number of random cumulative link failure sequences
require to achieve consistent GRA results, which in turn en-
hances that practicability of resilience assessment by signiﬁ-
cantly reducing the computational complexity involved in
simulating all possible sewer failure combinations.
 Building resilience in UDSs to unexpected failures necessitates
explicit consideration of the contribution of different failure
modes, effect of interactions between different failures modes
for example interdependences between sewer failures and hy-
draulic overloading in UDS design or performance evaluation of
existing systems.
 Building resilience in UDSs should not only be addressed
through capital investments aimed at enhancing inherent UDS
properties such as redundancy and ﬂexibility but should also
consider investments in asset management strategies such as
improved cleaning and maintenance of existing UDSs.
Table A.3
Distributed storage tank volumes.
Storage tank ID Volume (m3)
ds1 9,433
ds2 6,711
ds3 7,782
ds4 10,956
ds567 13,743
ds8 1,151
ds9 6,770
ds10 16,287
ds11 8,582
ds12 9,181
ds13 5,639
ds14 7,591
ds16 6,243
ds17 13,623
ds19 5,899
ds20 17,906
ds21 12,239
ds22 8,011
ds23 10,052
ds24 2,859
ds25 22,547
ds26 13,051
ds31 47,864
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
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AppendixTable A.1
Sub catchment area and computed percentage imperviousness.
Sub catchment ID Sub catchment area (ha) Imperviousness (%)
S1 83.6 69.9
S2 59.5 71.3
S3 69.0 67.2
S4 97.2 84.1
S5 52.0 81.1
S6 46.1 76.6
S7 23.8 82.7
S8 10.2 66.2
S9 60.0 72.4
S10 144.4 72.0
S11 76.1 71.5
S12 81.4 71.1
S13 50.0 79.6
S14 67.3 75.3
S15 57.4 70.7
S16 55.4 52.3
S17 67.9 61.5
S18 52.9 56.6
S19 52.3 66.7
S20 158.8 61.5
S21 108.5 71.6
S22 71.0 78.2
S23 89.1 82.1
S24 25.4 85.7
S25 199.9 68.1
S26 115.7 62.7
S27 147.5 80.7
S28 134.4 75.8
S29 23.1 81.1
S30 88.7 69.1
S31 424.4 73.0
Total Area 2,793.2
Table A.2
Hydraulic data of selected trapezoidal open channel sections in the Nakivubo UDS. The s
Link Length (m) Depth, d (m) Bottom width, b (m)
C12 100.0 1.8 4.3
C40 290.0 2.5 1.0
C54 512.6 1.5 1.0
C76 400.0 4.3 17.4
C81 400.0 2.0 26.0
ds30 10,000
ds29 2,609
ds28 15,160
ds27 16,636
ds15 6,474lope values represent ratios of horizontal to vertical distance.
Left slope Right slope Equivalent pipe diameter, De (m)
0.743 0.743 3.5
1.000 1.000 3.3
0.667 0.667 2.0
0.040 0.040 9.8
1.375 1.375 8.6
Fig. A.1. Computed Nakivubo sub catchment slopes.
Fig. A.2. Layout of adapted UDS (a) centralised storage (CS) and (b) upstream distributed storage (DS) strategy.3
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Fig. A.4. Effect of random cumulative link failure on total ﬂood volume (aec) and mean nodal ﬂood duration (def). 200 random link failure sequences (16,400 random link failure
scenarios) are simulated for the existing UDS (nsi: i¼ 1,2,3 … 200), for the CS Strategy (csi: i¼ 1,2,3 … 200) and for the DS Strategy (dsi: i¼ 1,2,3 … 200). In total, 49,200 link failure
scenarios are simulated.
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